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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1955 
 ___________ 
 
 GEORGE L. KOYNOK, 
Appellant 
 v. 
 
THOMAS R. LLOYD, Mayor of Dormont Borough; 
 JOSEPH M. COSTANZO, former President of Dormont Borough Council; 
KRISTEN DENNE, former Assistant Manager of Dormont Borough; 
THOMAS H. AYOOB, III, Solicitor of Dormont Borough;  
PATRICK KELLY, Building Inspector/Code Enforcement Officer;  
RUSSELL J. MCKIBBEN, former interim Borough Manager and Police Chief of 
Dormont Borough, BOROUGH OF DORMONT   
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-1200) 
 District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2011 
 Before:   SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
               (Opinion filed January 5,  2011)                                                                        
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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 George Koynok appeals from an order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to Dormont Borough and several of its past and present employees 
(Appellees).  We will affirm. 
I. 
  For over fifty years Koynok has owned a multi-level residential building at 
2850 Glenmore Avenue in Dormont Borough, which is part of the Pittsburgh 
metropolitan area.  After the Dormont Borough Zoning Hearing Board (the ZHB) and the 
Pennsylvania courts rejected Koynok‟s recent attempts to have his property function in 
part as a for-profit boardinghouse, Koynok filed suit in federal court.  The District Court 
concluded that Koynok‟s “cause of action is nothing more than a „spin-off‟ of a state 
court action, that it suffers a fatal Rooker-Feldman defect, and that it must, therefore, be 
dismissed with prejudice.”1  We vacated the District Court‟s decision and remanded 
because the record was insufficiently developed for a proper Rooker-Feldman analysis.  
See Koynok v. Lloyd, 328 F. App‟x 133, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2009). 
  Thereafter, Koynok moved for and was granted leave to file an amended 
complaint.  In the amended complaint, Koynok essentially claimed that, in preventing 
                                        
1  The District Court was referring to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “takes its 
name from the only two cases in which the Supreme Court has applied it to defeat federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).”  Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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him from operating 2850 Glenmore Avenue as a boardinghouse, Appellees violated 
Koynok‟s Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process, substantive due 
process, and equal protection under the law.  Appellees filed their answer to Koynok‟s 
amended complaint and then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The District Court denied Appellees‟ motion “without 
prejudice to . . . raising the issues set forth therein in a motion for summary judgment at 
the appropriate time following discovery.”  Discovery and opposing motions for 
summary judgment followed.  By order entered March 5, 2010, the District Court granted 
Appellees‟ motion for summary judgment and denied Koynok‟s motion for summary 
judgment.  Koynok appealed.     
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of 
the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 
623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  We apply the same test as the District Court.  Id.  
“Hence, summary judgment is appropriate when there „is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact‟ and the moving party is „entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‟”  
Alabama v. North Carolina, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2308 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)). 
III.  
  Koynok‟s opening brief is filled with arguments that are not germane to 
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whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on 
Koynok‟s Fourteenth Amendment claims.2  Because Koynok has been preceding pro se, 
we have liberally construed his arguments on appeal.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 
89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  Nevertheless, we conclude that the District Court‟s grant of 
summary judgment for Appellees was correct.   
  First, we agree with the District Court that Appellees were entitled to 
summary judgment on Koynok‟s procedural due process claim.  In particular, the District 
Court correctly determined that Koynok cannot show that he was deprived of due process 
during the 2003 ZBH proceedings because Koynok failed to take advantage of all 
available avenues for appellate review.  See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have 
taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her . . ..”).  We also 
conclude that, with respect to the subsequent “special exception” action, Koynok was 
afforded all process he was due; it is evident from the record that both the ZHB and the 
Pennsylvania courts conducting appellate review took great pains to discern and 
                                        
2  For example, Koynok argues that this Court must void the 2006 ZHB decision denying 
his request for a “special exception” to use 2850 Glenmore Avenue as a boardinghouse.  
We cannot and will not.  The 2006 ZHB decision was upheld by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court and, as our previous opinion in this case should have made clear to 
Koynok, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction where a federal action „would be the equivalent of an appellate review‟ of a 
state court judgment.”  Koynok, 328 F. App‟x at 136 (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny 
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
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comprehensively evaluate Koynok‟s rather convoluted arguments.   
 Second, we agree with the District Court that Appellees were entitled to summary 
judgment on Koynok‟s substantive due process claim.  “Land-use decisions are matters 
of local concern, and such disputes should not be transformed into substantive due 
process claims based only on allegations that government officials acted with „improper‟ 
motives.”  United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 
402 (3d Cir. 2003).  Instead, a land-use decision “violates substantive due process only 
when it shocks the conscience.”  Id. at 399-400.  Such a characterization is reserved for 
truly egregious official conduct, see id., and not for the conduct at issue in Koynok‟s 
ongoing dispute with Dormont Borough.  See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 
274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).
3
 
  Finally, we agree with the District Court that Appellees were entitled to 
summary judgment on Koynok‟s equal protection claim.  To withstand summary 
judgment, Koynok needed to identify at least one disputed material fact that would result 
in a genuine issue as to whether the ZHB intentionally and with no rational basis treated 
                                        
3  The record suggests that for many years Appellees knew of, but were not overly 
concerned with, Koynok‟s non-conforming use of 2850 Glenmore Avenue as a 
boardinghouse.  However, the non-conforming use roused Koynok‟s neighbors, who 
complained of parking and property value issues.  (2003 ZHB decision, Supp. App‟x at 
51); (E-mail to Patrick Kelly, Supp. App‟x at 187) (“The northern side of Glenmore 
Avenue is one of the borough‟s more highend [sic] streets, and those of us who live there 
would like to keep it that way.”).  There is nothing conscience-shocking about Appellees‟ 
concerted effort to simultaneously alleviate public concern and enforce local law.      
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Koynok differently from his peers when the requests for authorization to use 2850 
Glenmore Avenue as a boardinghouse were rejected.  See Village of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam).
4 
 That standard “is doubtless difficult for a 
plaintiff to meet in a zoning dispute,” Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286, and Koynok produced 
no evidence in the District Court showing that he could meet it.
5
 
IV. 
  For the reasons given in this opinion, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
                                        
4  As Appellees correctly note, “Koynok does not plead that he is a member of a suspect 
class,” but “the court can imply that he is asserting his equal protection claim as a „class 
of one.‟”  (Appellees‟ Br. at 26.) 
 
5  In their motion for summary judgment, Appellees argued that “Koynok has failed to 
state a cause of action as to the individual Defendants” on the basis of qualified 
immunity.  Because Koynok put forth no evidence that the individual defendants violated 
his constitutional rights, as explained above, the District Court correctly determined that 
they were entitled to qualified immunity.  See Pearson v. Callahan, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 
808, 815-16 (2009).  
